Causal models defined in terms of structural equations have proved to be quite a powerful way of representing knowledge regarding causality. However, a number of authors have given examples that seem to show that the Halpern-Pearl (HP) definition of causality [Halpern and Pearl 2005] gives intuitively unreasonable answers.
Introduction
Causal models defined in terms of structural equations have proved to be quite a powerful way of representing knowledge regarding causality. For example, they have been used to find causes of errors in software [Beer et al. 2012] and have been shown to be useful in predicting human attributions of responsibility [Gerstenberg and Lagnado 2010; Lagnado, Gerstenberg, and Zultan 2013] . However, a number of authors [Glymour et al. 2010; Hall 2007; Livengood 2013; Spohn 2008; Weslake 2014] authors have given examples that seem to show that the Halpern-Pearl (HP) definition of causality [Halpern and Pearl 2005] gives intuitively unreasonable answers. One contribution of this paper is to show that these "problematic" examples can be dealt with in a relatively uniform way, by being a little more careful about the choice of causal model.
The need to choose the causal model carefully has been pointed out frequently [Blanchard and Schaffer 2013; Hall 2007; Halpern and Pearl 2005; Halpern and Hitchcock 2010; Hitchcock 2001; Hitchcock 2007] . A causal model is characterized by the choice of variables, the equations relating them, and which variables we choose to make exogenous and endogenous (roughly speaking, which are the variables we choose to take as given and by the exogenous variables. For example, in a voting scenario, we could have endogenous variables that describe what the voters actually do (i.e., which candidate they vote for), exogenous variables that describe the factors that determine how the voters vote, and a variable describing the outcome (who wins). The structural equations describe how the outcome is determined (majority rules; a candidate wins if A and at least two of B, C, D, and E vote for him; etc.).
Formally, a causal model M is a pair (S, F ), where S is a signature, which explicitly lists the endogenous and exogenous variables and characterizes their possible values, and F defines a set of modifiable structural equations, relating the values of the variables. A signature S is a tuple (U, V, R), where U is a set of exogenous variables, V is a set of endogenous variables, and R associates with every variable Y ∈ U ∪ V a nonempty set R(Y ) of possible values for Y (that is, the set of values over which Y ranges). For simplicity, I assume here that V is finite, as is R(Y ) for every endogenous variable Y ∈ V. F associates with each endogenous variable X ∈ V a function denoted F X such that F X : (× U∈U R(U )) × (× Y ∈V−{X} R(Y )) → R(X). This mathematical notation just makes precise the fact that F X determines the value of X, given the values of all the other variables in U ∪ V. If there is one exogenous variable U and three endogenous variables, X, Y , and Z, then F X defines the values of X in terms of the values of Y , Z, and U . For example, we might have F X (u, y, z) = u + y, which is usually written as X = U + Y . 1 Thus, if Y = 3 and U = 2, then X = 5, regardless of how Z is set.
The structural equations define what happens in the presence of external interventions. Setting the value of some variable X to x in a causal model M = (S, F ) results in a new causal model, denoted M X=x , which is identical to M , except that the equation for X in F is replaced by X = x.
Following [Halpern and Pearl 2005] , I restrict attention here to what are called recursive (or acyclic) models. This is the special case where there is some total ordering ≺ of the endogenous variables (the ones in V) such that if X ≺ Y , then X is independent of Y , that is, F X (. . . , y, . . .) = F X (. . . , y ′ , . . .) for all y, y ′ ∈ R(Y ). Intuitively, if a theory is recursive, there is no feedback. If X ≺ Y , then the value of X may affect the value of Y , but the value of Y cannot affect the value of X. It should be clear that if M is an acyclic causal model, then given a context, that is, a setting u for the exogenous variables in U, there is a unique solution for all the equations. We simply solve for the variables in the order given by ≺. The value of the variables that come first in the order, that is, the variables X such that there is no variable Y such that Y ≺ X, depend only on the exogenous variables, so their value is immediately determined by the values of the exogenous variables. The values of variables later in the order can be determined once we have determined the values of all the variables earlier in the order.
A language for reasoning about causality
To define causality carefully, it is useful to have a language to reason about causality. Given a signature S = (U, V, R), a primitive event is a formula of the form X = x, for X ∈ V and x ∈ R(X). A causal formula (over S) is one of the form [Y 1 ← y 1 , . . . , Y k ← y k ]ϕ, where • ϕ is a Boolean combination of primitive events,
• Y 1 , . . . , Y k are distinct variables in V, and
Such a formula is abbreviated as [ Y ← y]ϕ. The special case where k = 0 is abbreviated as ϕ. Intuitively, [Y 1 ← y 1 , . . . , Y k ← y k ]ϕ says that ϕ would hold if Y i were set to y i , for i = 1, . . . , k.
A causal formula ψ is true or false in a causal model, given a context. As usual, I write (M, u) |= ψ if the causal formula ψ is true in causal model M given context u. The |= relation is defined inductively. (M, u) |= X = x if the variable X has value x in the unique (since we are dealing with acyclic models) solution to the equations in M in context u (that is, the unique vector of values for the exogenous variables that simultaneously satisfies all equations in M with the variables in U set to u). The truth of conjunctions and negations is defined in the standard way. Finally, (M, u) |= [ Y ← y]ϕ if (M Y = y , u) |= ϕ. I write M |= ϕ if (M, u) |= ϕ for all contexts u.
The definition(s) of causality
The HP definition of causality, like many others, is based on counterfactuals. The idea is that A is a cause of B if, if A hadn't occurred (although it did), then B would not have occurred. But there are many examples showing that this naive definition will not quite work. To take just one example, consider the following story, due to Ned Hall and already discussed in [Halpern and Pearl 2005] , from where the following version is taken.
Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at a bottle. Suzy's rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy's would have shattered the bottle had it not been preempted by Suzy's throw.
We would like to say that Suzy's throw is a cause of the bottle shattering, and Billy's is not. But if Suzy hadn't thrown, Billy's rock would have hit the bottle and shattered it.
The HP definition of causality is intended to deal with this example, and many others.
Definition 2.1: X = x is an actual cause of ϕ in (M, u) if the following three conditions hold:
AC2. There is a partition of V (the set of endogenous variables) into two subsets Z and W 2 with X ⊆ Z and a setting x ′ and w of the variables in X and W , respectively, such that if (M, u) |= Z = z for all Z ∈ Z (i.e., z is the value of the random variable Z in the real world), then both of the following conditions hold:
ϕ for all subsets W ′ of W and all subsets Z ′ of Z, where I abuse notation and write W ′ ← w to denote the assignment where the variables in W ′ get the same values as they would in the assignment W ← w, and similarly for Z ′ ← z.
AC3. X is minimal; no subset of X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2.
The tuple ( W , w, x ′ ) is said to be a witness to the fact that X = x is a cause of ϕ.
AC1 just says that X = x cannot be considered a cause of ϕ unless both X = x and ϕ actually happen. AC3 is a minimality condition, which ensures that only those elements of the conjunction X = x that are essential for changing ϕ in AC2(a) are considered part of a cause; inessential elements are pruned. Without AC3, if dropping a lit cigarette is a cause of a fire then so is dropping the cigarette and sneezing. AC3 serves here to strip "sneezing" and other irrelevant, over-specific details from the cause.
AC2 is the core of the definition. We can think of the variables in Z as making up the "causal path" from X to ϕ. Intuitively, changing the value of some variable in X results in changing the value(s) of some variable(s) in Z, which results in the values of some other variable(s) in Z being changed, which finally results in the value of ϕ changing. The remaining endogenous variables, the ones in W , are off to the side, so to speak, but may still have an indirect effect on what happens. AC2(a) is essentially the standard counterfactual definition of causality, but with a twist. If we want to show that X = x is a cause of ϕ, we must show (in part) that if X had a different value, then so too would ϕ. However, this effect of the value of X on the value of ϕ may not hold in the actual context; essentially, it ensures that X alone suffices to bring about the change from ϕ to ¬ϕ; setting W to w merely eliminates possibly spurious side effects that may mask the effect of changing the value of X. Moreover, although the values of variables on the causal path (i.e., the variables Z) may be perturbed by the change to W , this perturbation has no impact on the value of ϕ. As I said above, if (M, u) |= Z = z, then z is the value of the variable Z in the context u (i.e., in the actual situation). We capture the fact that the perturbation has no impact on the value of ϕ by saying that if some variables Z on the causal path were set to their original values in the context u, ϕ would still be true, as long as X = x. Roughly speaking, it says that if the variables in X are reset to their original value, then ϕ holds, even under the contingency W ′ = w and even if some variables in Z are given their original values (i.e., the values in z). The fact that AC2(b) must hold even if only a subset W ′ of the variables in W are set to their values in w (so that the variables in W − W ′ essentially act as they do in the real world) and only a subset of the variables in Z are set to their values in the actual world says that we must have ϕ even if some things happen as they do in the actual world. See Sections 3.1 and 4 for further discussion of and intuition for AC2(b).
The original HP paper [Halpern and Pearl 2001] used a weaker version of AC2(b). Rather than requiring that (M, u) |= [ X ← x, W ′ ← w, Z ′ ← z]ϕ for all subsets W ′ of W , it was required to hold only for W . That is, the following condition was used instead of AC2(b).
The change from AC2(b ′ ) to AC2(b) may seem rather technical, but it has some nontrivial consequences. One of the contributions of this paper is to examine whether it is necessary; see Section 4 for details.
To deal with other problems in the HP definition, various authors have added the idea of normality to the definition. This can be done in a number of ways. I now briefly sketch one way that this can be done, following the approach in [Halpern and Hitchcock 2014] . (See Section 5 for some discussion of the need for normality.) Take a world (in a model M ) to be a complete assignment of values to all the variables in M . 3 We assume a partial preorder on worlds, that is, a reflexive transitive relation. 4 Intuitively, if s s ′ , then s is at least as normal, or typical, as s ′ . We can use normality in the definition of causality in two ways. Say that a world s is a witness world for X = x being a cause of ϕ in (M, u) if there is a witness ( W , w, x ′ ) to X = x being a cause of ϕ and s = s X= x ′ , W = w, u , where s X= x ′ , W = w, u is the world that results by setting X to x ′ and W to w in context u. We can then modify AC2(a) so as to require that we consider X = x to be a cause of ϕ in (M, u) only if the witness world s for X = x being a cause is such that s s u , where s u is the world determined by context u. This says that, in determining causality, we consider only possibilities that result from altering atypical features of a world to make them more typical, rather than vice versa. This captures an observation made by Kahneman and Miller [1986] regarding human ascriptions of causality.
A somewhat more refined use of normality is to use it to "grade" causes. Say that s is a best witness for X = x being a cause of ϕ if s is a witness world for X = x being a cause of ϕ and there is no other witness world s ′ for X = x being a cause of ϕ such that s ′ ≻ s. (Note that there may be more than one best witness.) We can then grade candidate causes according to the normality of their best witnesses (without requiring that there must be a witness s such that s s u ). Experimental evidence suggests that people are focusing on the cause with the best witness (according to their subjective ordering on worlds); see, e.g., [Cushman, Knobe, and Sinnott-Armstrong 2008; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009; Knobe and Fraser 2008] .
The Examples
In this section, I consider examples due to Spohn [2008] , Weslake [2014] , Hall [2007] , Glymour et al. [2010] , and Livengoo4citeyearLiv13. I go through these examples in turn. I set the scene by considering the rock-throwing example mentioned above. 3 In [Halpern and Hitchcock 2014] , a world is defined as a complete assignment of values to the exogenous variables, but this is a typo. 4 is not necessarily a partial order; in particular, it does not necessarily satisfy antisymmetry (i.e., s s ′ and s ′ s does not necessarily imply s = s ′ ).
Throwing rocks at bottles
A naive model of the rock-throwing story just has binary random variables ST, BT, and BS (for "Suzy throws", "Billy throws", and "bottle shatters", with the value of BS given by the equation BS = ST ∨ BT: the bottle shatters if one of Suzy and Billy throws. Call this model M RT . Let u be the context that results in ST = BT = 1: Suzy and Billy both throw. M RT is described in Figure 1 
As already pointed out by Halpern and Pearl [2005] , in M RT Suzy and Billy play completely symmetric roles. Not surprisingly, both ST = 1 and BT = 1 are causes of BS = 1 according to the HP definition. Clearly, M RT cannot be used to distinguish a situation where Suzy is a cause from one where Billy is a cause.
In the story as given, people seem to agree that Suzy's throw is a cause and Billy's throw is not, since Suzy's rock hit the bottle and Billy's did not. M RT does not capture this fact. Following Halpern and Pearl [2005] , we extend M RT so that it can express the fact that Suzy's rock hit first by adding two more variables:
• BH for "Billy's rock hits the (intact) bottle", with values 0 (it doesn't) and 1 (it does); and
• SH for "Suzy's rock hits the bottle", again with values 0 and 1.
The equations are such that SH = ST (Suzy's rock hits the bottle if Suzy throws), BH = BT ∧ ¬SH (Billy's rock hits an intact bottle if Billy throws and Suzy's rock does not hit), and BS = SH ∨ BH (the bottle shatters if either Suzy's rock or Billy's rock hit it). Now if Suzy and Bill both throw (ST = 1 and BT = 1), Suzy's rock hits the bottle (SH = 1), so that Billy's rock does not hit an intact bottle (BH = 0). Call the resulting model M ′ RT . M ′ RT is described in Figure 2 (with the exogenous variable omitted). In this model BT = 1 is not a cause. For example, if we take Z = {BT, BH, BS} in AC2 and set ST = 0, then while it is the case that BS = 0 if BT = 0 and BS = 1 if BT = 1, it is not the case that BT = 1 if we set BH to its original value of 0. This example shows the necessity of allowing some variables in Z to be set to their original values in AC2(b). This captures the intuition that Billy's throw is not a cause because, in the actual world, his rock did not hit the bottle (BH = 0). By AC2(b), to establish BT = 1 as a cause of BS = 1, it would have to force BS = 1 even if BH = 0, which is not the case.
Spohn's example
The next example is due to Spohn [2008] .
Example 3.1: There are four endogenous binary variables, A, B, C, and S, taking values 1 (on) and 0 (off). Intuitively, A and B are supposed to be alternative causes of C, and S acts as a switch. If S = 0, the causal route from A to C is active and that from B to C is dead; and if S = 1, the causal route from A to C is dead and the one from B to C is active. There are no causal relations between A, B, and S; their values are determined by the context. The equation
Suppose that the context is such that A = B = S = 1, so C = 1. The HP definition yields B = 1 and S = 1 as causes of C = 1, as we would hope. But, unfortunately, it also yields A = 1 as a cause of C = 1. The argument is that in the contingency where S is set to 0, then if A = 0, then C = 0, while if A = 1, then C = 1. This does not seem so reasonable. Intuitively, if S = 1, then the value of A seems irrelevant to the outcome. Considerations of normality do not help here; all worlds seem to be equally normal.
But now consider a slightly different story. This time, we view B as the switch, rather than S.
Although this is perhaps not as natural a story as the original, such a switch is surely implementable. In any case, a little playing with propositional logic shows that, in this story, C satisfies exactly the same equation as before:
The key point is that, unlike the first story, in the second story, it seems to me quite reasonable to say that A = 1 is a cause of C = 1 (as are S = 1 and B = 1). Having A = 1 is necessary for the first "mechanism" to work.
Given that we have different causal intuitions for the stories, we should model them differently. One way to distinguish them is to add two more endogenous random variables, say D and E, that describe the ways that C could be 1. In Spohn's original story, we would have the equation D = ¬S ∧ A, E = S ∧ B, and C = D ∨ E. In this model, since D = 0 in the actual context, it is not hard to see that A = 1 is not a cause of C = 1, while B = 1 and S = 1 are, as they should be. Thus, in this model, we correctly capture our intuitions for the story.
To capture the second story, we can add variables D ′ and E ′ such that D ′ = B ∧ (A ∨ S), E ′ = ¬B ∧ A ∧ S, and C = D ′ ∨ E ′ . In this model, it is not hard to see that all of A = 1, B = 1, and S = 1 are causes of C = 1.
This approach of adding extra variables leads to an obvious question: What is the role of these variables? I view D and E (resp., D ′ and E ′ ) as "structuring" variables, that help an agent "structure" a causal story. Consider Spohn's original story. We can certainly design a circuit where there is a source of power at A and B, a physical switch at S, and a bulb at C that turns on (C = 1) if either there is a battery at A (A = 1) and the switch is turned left (S = 0) or there is battery at B (B = 1) and the switch is turned right (S = 1). In this physical setup, there is no analogue of D and E. Nevertheless, to the extent that we view the models as a modeler's description of what is going, a modeler could usefully introduce D and E to describe the conditions under which C = 1, and to disambiguate this model from one where, conceptually, we might want to think of other ways that C could be 1 (as in the story with D ′ and E ′ ).
Note that we do not want to think of D as being defined to take the value 1 if A = 1 and S = 0. For then we could not intervene to set D = 0 if A = 1 and S = 0. Adding a variable to the model commits us to be able to intervene on it. 5 In the real world, setting D to 0 despite having A = 1 and S = 0 might correspond to the connection being faulty when the switch is turned left. Indeed, since the equation for C is the same in both stories, it is only at the level of interventions that the difference between the two stories becomes meaningful.
Weslake's example
The next example is due to Weslake [2014, Example 10] .
Example 3.2:
A lamp L is controlled by three switches, A, B, and C, each of which has three possible positions, −1, 0, and 1. The lamp switches on iff two or more of the switches are in same position. Thus,
. Suppose that, in the actual context, A = 1, B = −1, and C = −1. Intuition suggests that while B = −1 and C = −1 should be causes of L = 1, A = 1 should not: since the setting of A does not match that of either B or C, it has no causal impact on the outcome. The HP definition indeed declares B = −1 and C = −1 to be causes; unfortunately, it also declares A = 1 to be a cause. For in the contingency where B = 1 and C = −1, if A = 1 then L = 1, while if A = 0 then L = 0. Adding defaults to the picture does not solve the problem.
Just as in the Spohn example, we can tell another story where the observed variables have the same values, and are connected by the same structural equations. Now suppose that L = 1 iff either (a) none of A, B, or C is in position −1, (b) none of A, B, or C is in position 0, or (c) none of A, B, or C is in position 1. It is easy to see that the equations for L are literally the same as in the original example. But now it seems more reasonable to say that A = 1 is a cause of L = 1. Certainly A = 1 causes L = 1 as a result of no values being 0; had A been 0, then the lamp would still have been on, but now it would be as a result of no values being −1. Considering the contingency where B = 1 and C = −1 "uncovers" the causal impact of A.
Again, we can capture the distinction between the two stories by adding more variables. For the second story, we can add the variables NOT (−1), NOT (0), and NOT (1)
. Now the HP definition makes A = 1 a cause of L = 1 (as well as B = −1 and C = −1). For Weslake's original story we can add the variables TWO(−1), TWO(0), and TWO (1), where TWO (i) = 1 iff at least two of A, B, and C are i, and take L = TWO(−1) ∨ TWO(0) ∨ T W O(1). Now the HP definition does not make A = 1 a cause of L = 1 (although, of course B = 1 and C = 1 continue to be causes).
Once again, I think of the variables NOT (−1), NOT (0), and NOT (1) (resp., TWO(−1), TWO(0), and TWO (1)) as "structuring" variables, that help the modeler distinguish the two scenarios. They are conceptually meaningful even if they don't have a physical analogue. Hall's [2007] gives an example that's meant to illustrate how a bad choice of variables leads to unreasonable answers. I repeat it here because, although I agree with his main point (that, indeed, is one of the main points of this paper!), I disagree with one of his conclusions. What I present is actually a slightly simplified version of his example that retains all the necessary features.
Hall's example
Consider a model with four variables, A, B, D, and E. Variables A and D are exogenous; their values are determined by the context. The values of B and E are given by the equations B = A and E = D. 6 Suppose that the context u is such that A = D = 1. Then clearly, in context u, A = 1 is a cause of B = 1 and not a cause of E = 1, while D = 1 is a cause of E = 1 and not of B = 1. The problem comes if we replace A in the model by X, where intuitively, X = 1 iff A and D agree (i.e., if A = D = 1 or if A = D = 0). Now we can recover the value of A from that of D and X; it is easy to see that A = 1 iff X = D = 1 or X = D = 0. Thus, we can rewrite the equation for B by taking B = 1 iff X = D = 1 or X = D = 0. Call the original model M and the new model (with variables X, B, D, and E) M ′ . In (M ′ , u), it is still the case that D = 1 is a cause of E = 1, but now D = 1 is a also a cause of E = 1. Hall [2007] says "This result is plainly silly, and doesn't look any less silly if you insist that causal claims must always be relativized to a model." I disagree. To be more precise, I would argue that Hall has in mind a particular picture of the world, that captured by model M . Of course, if that is the "right" picture of the world, the conclusion that D = 1 is a cause of B = 1 is indeed plainly silly. But consider the following two stories. We are trying to determine the preferences of two people, Betty and Edward, in an election. B = 1 if Betty is recorded as prefering the Democrats and B = 0 if Betty is recorded as prefering the Republicans, and similarly for E. In the first story, we send Alice to talk to Betty and David to talk to find out their preferences (both are assumed to be truthful and good at finding things out). When Alice reports that Betty prefers the Democrats (A = 1) then Betty is reported as preferring the Democrats (B = 1); similarly for David and Edward. Clearly, in this story (which is modeled by M ) D = 1 causes E = 1, but not B = 1.
But now suppose instead of sending Alice to talk to Betty, Xavier is sent to talk to Carol, who knows only whether Betty and Edward have the same preferences. Carol tells Alice that they indeed have the same preferences (X = 1). Upon hearing that X = B = 1, the vote tabulator correctly concludes that B = 1. This story is modeled by M ′ . But in this case it strikes me as perfectly reasonable that D = 1 should be a cause of B = 1. This is true despite that fact that if we had included the variable A in M ′ , it would have been the case that A = B = 1.
Glymour et al.'s example
The next example is due to Glymour et al. [2010] .
Example 3.3:
A ranch has five individuals: a 1 , . . . , a 5 . They have to vote on two possible outcomes: staying around the campfire (O = 0) or going on a round-up (O = 1). Let A i be the random variable denoting a i 's vote, so A i = j if a i votes for outcome j. There is a complicated rule for deciding on the outcome. If a 1 and a 2 agree (i.e., if A 1 = A 2 ), then that is the outcome. If a 2 , . . . , a 5 agree, and a 1 votes differently, then then outcome is given by a 1 's vote (i.e., O = A 1 ). Otherwise, majority rules. In the actual situation, A 1 = A 2 = 1 and A 3 = A 4 = A 5 = 0, so by the first mechanism, O = 1. The question is what were the causes of O = 1.
Using the naive causal model with just the variables A 1 , . . . , A 5 , O, and the obvious equations describing O in terms of A 1 , . . . , A 5 , it is almost immediate that A 1 = 1 is a cause of O = 1. Changing A 1 to 0 results in O = 0. Somewhat surprisingly, in this naive model, A 2 = 1, A 3 = 0, A 4 = 0, and A 5 = 0 are also causes. 7 To see that A 2 = 1 is a cause, consider the contingency where A 3 = 1. Now if A 2 = 0, then O = 0 (majority rules); if A 2 = 1, then O = 1, since A 1 = A 2 = 1, and O = 1 even if A 3 is set back to its original value of 0. To see that A 3 = 0 is a cause, consider the contingency where A 2 = 0, so that all voters but a 1 vote for 0 (staying at the campsite). If A 3 = 1, then O = 0 (majority rules). If A 3 = 0, then O = 1, by the second mechanism (a 1 is the only vote for 0), while if A 2 is set to its original value of 1, then we still have O = 1, now by the second mechanism.
But all this talk of mechanisms (which is also implicit in Glymour et al. [2010] ; in footnote 11, they say that setting A 2 back to its original value of 1 "brings out the original result, but in a different way") suggests that the mechanism should be part of the model. There are several ways of doing this. One is to add three new variables, call them M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 . These variables have values in {0, 1, 2}, where M j = 0 if mechanism j is active and suggests an outcome 0, M j = 1 if mechanism j is active and suggests an outcome of 1, and M j = 2 if mechanism j is not active. (We actually don't need the value M 3 = 2; mechanism 3 is always active, because there is always a majority with 5 voters, all of whom must vote.) Note that at most one of the first two mechanisms can be active. We have obvious equations linking the value of M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 to the values of A 1 , . . . , A 5 . Now the value of O just depends on the values of M 1 , M 2 , and
It is easy to see that in this model, if A 1 = A 2 = 1 and A 3 = A 4 = A 5 = 0, then none of A 3 = 0, A 4 = 0, and A 5 = 0 are causes. A 1 = 1 is cause, as we would expect, as are A 2 = 1 and M 2 = 1. This which seems reasonable: the second mechanism was the one that resulted in the outcome, and it required A 1 = A 2 = 1.
Now suppose that we change the description of the voting rule. We take O = 1 if one of the following two mechanisms applies:
• A 1 = 1 and it is not the case that both A 2 = 0 and exactly one of A 3 , A 4 , and A 5 is 1.
• A 1 = 0, A 2 = 1, and exactly two of A 3 , A 4 , and A 5 are 1.
It is not hard to check that, although the description is different, O satisfies the same equation in both stories. But now it does not seem so unreasonable that A 2 = 1, A 3 = 0, A 4 = 0, and A 5 = 0 are causes of O = 1. And indeed, if we construct a model in terms of these two mechanisms (i.e., add variables M ′ 1 and M ′ 2 that correspond to these two mechanisms), then it is not hard to see that A 1 = 1, A 2 = 1, A 3 = 0, A 4 = 0, and A 5 = 0 are all causes.
Here the role of the structuring variables M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 (resp. M ′ 1 and M ′ 2 ) as descriptors of the mechanism being invoked seems particularly clear. For example, setting M 1 = 2 says that the first mechanism will not be applied, even if A 1 = A 2 ; setting M 1 = 1 says that we act as if both a 1 and a 2 voted in favor, even if that is not the case. As Livengood [2013] points out, voting can lead to some apparently unreasonable causal outcomes (at least, if we model things naively). He first considers Jack and Jill, who live in an overwhelmingly Republican district. As expected, the Republican candidate wins with an overwhelming majority. Jill would normally have voted Democrat, but did not vote because she was disgusted by the process. Jack would normally have voted Republican, but did not vote because he (correctly) assumed that his vote would not affect the outcome. In the naive model, both Jack and Jill are causes of the Republican victory. For if enough of the people who voted Republican had switched to voting Democrat, then if Jack (or Jill) had voted Democrat, the Democrat would have won, while he would not have won had they abstained. Notice that, in this argument, Jack and Jill are treated the same way; their preferences make no difference.
Livengood's voting examples
We can easily construct a model that takes these preferences into account. One way to do so is to assume that their preferences are so strong that we may as well take them for granted. Thus, the preferences become exogenous; the only endogenous variables are whether or not they vote. In this case, Jack's not voting is not a cause of the outcome, but Jill's not voting is.
More generally, with this approach, a voter whose preference is made exogenous and is a strong supporter of the victor does not count as a cause of victory. This does not seem so unreasonable. After all, in an analysis of a close political victory in Congress, when an analyst talks about the cause(s) of victory, she points to the swing voters who voted one way or the other, not the voters that were taken to be staunch supporters of one particular side.
That said, making a variable exogenous seems like a somewhat draconian solution to the problem. It also does not allow us to take into account smaller gradations in depth of feeling. At what point should a preference switch from being endogenous to exogenous? We can achieve the same effect in an arguably more natural way by using normality considerations. In the case of Jack and Jill, we can take voting for a Democrat to be highly abnormal for Jack, and voting for a Republican to be highly abnormal for Jill. To show that either Jack (resp., Jill) is a cause of the victory, we need to consider a contingency where Jack (resp., Jill) votes for the Democratic candidate. This would be a change to a highly abnormal world in the case of Jack, but to a more normal world in the case of Jill. Thus, if we use normality as a criterion for determining causality, Jill would count as a cause, but Jack would not. If we use normality as a way of grading causes, Jack and Jill would still both count as causes for the victory, but Jill would be a much better cause. More generally, the more normal it would be for someone to vote Democratic, the better a cause that voter would be. The use of normality here allows for a more nuanced gradation of cause than the rather blunt approach of either making a variable exogenous or endogenous. Now, following Livengood [2013] , consider a vote where everyone can either vote for one of three candidates. Suppose that the actual vote is 17-2-0 (i.e., 17 vote for candidate A, 2 for candidate B, and none for candidate C). Then not only is every vote for candidate A a cause of A winning, every vote for B is also a cause of A winning. To see this, consider a contingency where 8 of the voters for A switch to C. Then if one of the voters for B votes for C, the result is a tie; if that voter switches back to B, then A wins (even if some subset of the voters who switch from A to C switch back to A).
Is this reasonable? What makes it seem particularly unreasonable is that if it had just been a contest between A and B, with the vote 17-2, then the voters for B would not have been causes of A winning. Why should adding a third option make a difference?
In some cases it does seem reasonable that adding a third option makes a difference. For example, we speak of Nader costing Gore a victory over Bush in the 2000 election. But, as Livengood [2013] points out, we don't speak of Gore costing Nader a victory, although in a naive HP model of the situation, all the voters for Gore are causes of Nader not winning as much as the voters for Nader are causes of Gore not winning. The discussion above points a way out of this dilemma. If a sufficiently large proportion of Bush and Gore voters are taken to be such strong supporters that they will never change their minds, and we make their votes exogenous, then it is still the case that Nader caused Gore to lose, but not the case that Gore caused Nader to lose. Similar considerations apply in the case of the 17-2 vote. (Again, we can use normality considerations to give arguably more natural models of these examples.) 8
Do we need AC2(b)?
In this section, I consider the extent to which we can use AC2(b ′ ) rather than AC2(b), and whether this is a good thing.
The Hopkins-Pearl example
I start by examining the Hopkins-Pearl example that was intended to show that AC2(b ′ ) was inappropriate. The following description is taken from [Halpern and Pearl 2005] .
Example 4.1: Suppose that a prisoner dies either if A loads B's gun and B shoots, or if C loads and shoots his gun. Taking D to represent the prisoner's death and making the obvious assumptions about the meaning of the variables, we have that D = (A ∧ B) ∨ C. Suppose that in the actual context u, A loads B's gun, B does not shoot, but C does load and shoot his gun, so that the prisoner dies. That is, A = 1, B = 0, and C = 1. Clearly C = 1 is a cause of D = 1. We would not want to say that A = 1 is a cause of D = 1, given that B did not shoot (i.e., given that B = 0). However, suppose that we take the obvious model with the random variables A, B, C, D. With AC2(b ′ ), A = 1 is a cause of D = 1. For we can take W = {B, C} and consider the contingency where B = 1 and C = 0. It is easy to check that AC2(a) and AC2(b ′ ) hold for this contingency, so under the original HP definition, A = 1 is a cause of D = 1. However, AC2(b) fails in this case, since
The key point is that AC2(b) says that for A = 1 to be a cause of D = 1, it must be the case that D = 0 if only some of the values in W are set to w. That means that the other variables get the same value as they do in the actual context; in this case, by setting only A to 1 and leaving B unset, B takes on its original value of 0, in which case D = 0. AC2(b ′ ) does not consider this case.
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Halpern and Hitchcock [2014] , we can use AC2(b ′ ) if we have the "right" model. Suppose that we add a new variable E such that E = A ∧ B, so that E = 1 iff A = B = 1, and set D = E ∨ C. Thus, we have captured the intuition that there are two ways that the prisoner dies. Either C shoots, or A loads and B fires (which is captured by E). It is easy to see that (using either AC2(b) or AC2(b ′ )) B = 0 is not a cause of D = 1.
As I now show, the ideas of this example generalize. But before doing that, I define the notion of a conservative extension.
Conservative extensions
In the rock-throwing example, adding the extra variables converted BT = 1 from being a cause to not being a cause of BS = 1. Similarly, adding extra variables affected causality in all the other examples above. Of course, without any constraints, it is easy to add variables to get any desired result. For example, consider the rock-throwing model M ′
RT . Suppose that we add a variable BH 1 with equations that set BH 1 = BT and BS = SH ∨ BT ∨ BH 1 . This results in a new "causal path" from BT to BS going through BH 1 , independent of all other paths. Not surprisingly, in this model, BT = 1 is indeed a cause of BS = 1.
But this seems like cheating. Adding this new causal path fundamentally changes the scenario; Billy's throw has a new way of affecting whether or not the bottle shatters. While it seems reasonable to refine a model by adding new information, we want to do so in a way that does not affect what we know about the old variables. Intuitively, suppose that we had a better magnifying glass and could look more carefully at the model. We might discover new variables that were previously hidden. But we want it to be the case that any setting of the old variables results in the same observations. That is, while adding the new variable refines the model, it does not fundamentally change it. This is made precise in the following definition.
Definition 4.2:
. That is, no matter how we set the variables other than X, X has the same value in context u in both M and M ′ .
According to the definition, M ′ is a conservative extension of M iff, for certain formulas ψ involving only variables in V, namely, those of the form [ W ← w](X = x), (M, u) |= ψ iff (M ′ , u) |= ψ. As the following lemma shows, this is actually true for all formulas involving only variables in V, not just ones of a special form. Proof: Worite X ≺ M Y if, in causal model M , X is independent of Y , so that changing the value of Y has no impact on the value of X, no matter what the setting of the other variables. It is almost immediate from the definition of conservative extension that for X,
Suppose that V = {X 1 , . . . , X n }. Since M is a recursive model, we can assume without loss of generality that these variables are ordered so that X 1 ≺ M · · · ≺ M X n . By the observation above, we also have X 1 ≺ M ′ · · · ≺ M ′ X n . I now prove by induction on j that, for all W ⊆ V, all settings w of the variables in W , all contexts u, and all
For the base case of the induction, given W , let W ′ = V − ( W ∪ {X 1 }), and let w ′ be an arbitrary setting of the variables in W ′ . Then we have
This completes the proof of the base case. Suppose that the result holds for 1, . . . , j and j < n; we prove it for j+1. Given W , now let
, and similarly for M ′ . Thus, 
Avoiding AC2(b)
I now show that we can always use AC2(b ′ ) instead of AC2(b), if we add extra variables.
Theorem 4.4:
Proof: Suppose that ( W , w, x ′ ) is a witness to X = x being a cause of Y = y in (M, u) using AC2(b ′ ). Let (M, u) |= W = w. We must have w = w * , for otherwise it is easy to see that X = x would be a cause of Y = y in (M, u) using AC(2b) with witness ( W , w, x ′ ).
If M ′ is a conservative extension of M with additional variables V ′ , and X = x is a cause of Y = y in (M, u) with witness ( W , w, x ′ ), we say that ( W ′ , w ′ , x ′ ) extends ( W , w, x ′ ), if W ⊆ W ′ ⊆ W ∪ V ′ and w ′ agrees with w on the variables in W . I now construct a conservative extension M ′ of M in which X = x is not a cause of Y = y using AC2(b ′ ) with a witness extending ( W ′ , w, x ′ ). Of course, this just kills one witness. I then show that we can construct further extensions to kill all other witnesses to X = x being a cause of Y = y using AC2(b ′ ).
Let M ′ be obtained from M by adding one new variable N . All the variables have the same equations in M and M ′ except for Y and (of course) N . The equations for N are easy to explain: if X = x and W = w, then N = 1; otherwise, N = 0. The equations for Y are the same in M and M ′ (and do not depend on the value of N ) except for two special cases. To define these cases, for each variable
That is, z x ′′ , w ′ is the value taken by Z if X is set to x ′′ and W is set to w. Let V ′ consist of all variables in V other than Y , let v ′ be a setting of the variables in V ′ , and let Z ′ consist of all variables in V ′ − W other than X. Then we want the equations for Y in M ′ to be such that for all j ∈ {0, 1}, we have
unless the assignment V ′ ← v ′ results in either (a) X = x, W = w, Z = z x, w for all Z ∈ Z ′ , and N = 0 or (b) X = x ′ , W = w, Z = z x ′ , w for all Z ∈ Z ′ , and N = 1. (Note that in both of these cases, the value of N is "abnormal". If X = x, W = w and Z = z x, w for all z ∈ Z ′ , then N should be 1; if we set X to x ′ and change the values of the variables in Z ′ accordingly, then N should be 0.) If (a) holds, Y = y ′ in M ′ ; if (b) holds, Y = y.
I now show that M ′ has the desired properties and, in addition, does not make X = x a cause in new ways.
Lemma 4.5:
(a) It is not the case that X = x is a cause of Y = y using AC2(b ′ ) in M ′ with a witness that extends ( W , w, x ′ ).
Proof: For part (a), suppose, by way of contradiction, that X = x is a cause of Y = y using AC2
, AC2(a) fails. So, in all cases, we get a contradiction to the assumption that X = x is a cause of Y = y using AC2
For part (b), note that the only variable in V for which the equations in M and M ′ are different is Y . Consider any setting of the variables in V other than Y . Except for the two special cases noted above, the value of Y is clearly the same in M and M ′ . But for these two special cases, as was noted above, the value of N is "abnormal", that is, it is not the same as its value according to the equations given the setting of the other variables. It follows that for all settings v of the variables V ′ in V other than Y and all values y ′′ of Y , we have
For part (c), suppose that X = x is a cause of Y = y in (M ′ , u) using AC2(b) (resp. AC2(b ′ )) with witness ( W ′ , w ′ , x ′′ ). Let W ′′ and w ′′ be the restriction of W ′ and w ′ , respectively, to the variables in V. Since the equations for Y are the same in M and M ′ except for two cases, as long as these two cases do not arise in showing that X = x is a cause of Y = y in (M ′ , u) with witness ( W ′ , w ′ , x ′′ ), then it is immediate that X = x is a cause of Y = y in (M, u) with witness ( W ′′ , w ′′ , x ′′ ). Consider the two special cases in turn. First suppose that setting W ′ = w ′ and X = x results in W = w, Z = z x, w for all Z ∈ Z ′ , and N = 0 (i.e., we are in the first of the two cases where the value of Y does not agree in (M, u) and (M ′ , u)). But then Y = y ′ , so this cannot be used to show that X = x is a cause of Y = y. Similarly, if the setting W ′ = w ′ and X = x ′′ results in the second of the two cases, then we must have x ′′ = x ′ and Y = y, so again, this cannot be used to show that X = x is a cause of Y = y, since AC2(a) would fail. This completes the proof of part (c).
Lemma 4.5 is not quite enough to complete the proof of Theorem 4.4. There may be several witnesses to X = x being a cause of Y = y in (M, u) using AC2(b ′ ). Although we have removed one of the witnesses, some others may remain, so that X = x may still be a cause of Y = y in (M ′ , u). But by Lemma 4.5(c), if there is a witness to X = x being a cause of Y = y in (M ′ , u), it must extend a witness to X = x being a cause of Y = y in (M, u). We can repeat the construction of Lemma 4.5 to kill this witness as well. Since there are only finitely many witnesses to X = x being a cause of Y = y in (M, u), after finitely many extensions, we can kill them all. After this is done, we have a causal model M * extending M such that X = x is not a cause of Y = y in (M * u) using AC2(b ′ ).
It is interesting to apply the construction of Theorem 4.4 to Example 4.1. The variable N added by the construction is almost identical to E. Indeed, the only difference is that N = 0 if A = B = C = 1, while E = 1 in this case. But since D = 1 if A = B = C = 1 and N = 0, the equations for D are the same in both causal models if A = B = C = 1. While it seems strange, given our understanding of the meaning of the variables, to have N = 0 if A = B = C = 1, it is easy to see that this definition works equally well in showing that A = 1 is not a cause of D = 1 using AC2(b ′ ) in the context where A = 1, B = 0, and C = 1.
Discussion
Theorem 4.4 suggests that, by adding extra variables appropriately, we can go back to the definition of causality using AC2(b ′ ) rather than AC2(b). This has some technical advantages. For example, with AC2(b ′ ), causes are always single conjuncts [Eiter and Lukasiewicz 2002; Hopkins 2001] . As shown in [Halpern 2008 ], this is not in general the case with AC2(b); it may be that X 1 = x 1 ∧ X 2 = x 2 is a cause of Y = y with neither X 1 = x 1 nor X 2 = x 2 being causes (see also Example 6.5). It also seems that testing for causality is harder using AC2(b). Eiter and Lukasiewicz [2002] show that, using AC2(b ′ ), testing for causality is NP-complete for binary models (where all random variables are binary) and Σ 2 -complete in general; with AC2(b), it seems to be Σ 2 -complete in the binary case and Π 3 -complete in the general case [Aleksandrowicz, Chockler, Halpern, and Ivrii 2014] .
On the other hand, adding extra variables may not always be a natural thing to do. For example, in Beer et al.'s [2012] analysis of software errors, the variables chosen for the analysis are determined by the program specification. Moreover, Beer et al. give examples where AC2(b) is needed to get the intuitively correct answer. Unless we are given a principled way of adding extra variables so as to be able to always use AC2(b ′ ), it is not clear how to automate an analysis. In addition, as we saw above, adding the extra variable N as in Theorem 4.4 rather than E result in an "unnatural" model. There does not always seem to be a "natural" way of adding extra variables so that AC2(b ′ ) suffices (even assuming that we can agree on what "natural" means!).
Adding extra variables also has an impact on complexity. Note that, in the worst case, we may have to add an extra variable for each pair (W, w) such that there is a witness (W, w, x ′ ) for X = x being a cause of Y = y. In all the standard examples, there are very few witnesses (typically 1-2), but I have been unable to prove a nontrivial bound on the number of witnesses.
More experience is needed to determine which of AC2(b) and AC2(b ′ ) is most appropriate. Fortunately, in many cases, the causality judgment is independent of which we use.
Normality
As was already observed in [Halpern and Hitchcock 2014] , the example that motivated the use of normality considerations can also be dealt with by adding variables to the model in an arguably reasonable way. Consider the following example, given by Hitchcock [2007] , based on an example due to Hiddleston [2005] .
Example 5.1: Assassin is in possession of a lethal poison, but has a last-minute change of heart and refrains from putting it in Victim's coffee. Bodyguard puts antidote in the coffee, which would have neutralized the poison had there been any. Victim drinks the coffee and survives. Is Bodyguard's putting in the antidote a cause of Victim surviving? Most people would say no, but according to the HP definition (with either AC2(b) or AC2(b ′ )), it is. For in the contingency where Assassin puts in the poison, Victim survives iff Bodyguard puts in the antidote.
What makes this particularly troubling is that the obvious naive model is isomorphic to the naive model in the rock-throwing example (illustrated in Figure 1) . Specifically, if we take A (for "assassin does not put in poison"), B (for "bodyguard puts in antidote"), and VS (for "victim survives"), then VS = A ∨ B, just as BS = ST ∨ BT. However, while most people agree that ST = 1 a cause of BS = 1 in this, they do not view A = 1 as a cause of VS = 1. Using normality considerations, we can say that A = 1 is not a cause because the witness world, where A = 0, is less normal than the actual world. It is not normal to put poison in coffee. But would we feel differently in a universe where poisoning occurred frequently, or was normal in the sense that it was accepted practice?
Arguably a better solution to this problem, already suggested in [Halpern and Hitchcock 2014] , is to add an additional variable. Suppose we add a variable PN to the model, representing whether a chemical reaction takes place in which poison is neutralized, where PN = ¬A ∧ B (A puts in the poison and B puts in the antidote) and VS = A ∨ PN , it is easy to check that now B = 1 is no longer a cause of VS = 1. Intuitively, the antidote is a cause of the victim living only if it actually neutralized the poison. Blanchard and Schaffer [2013] have used this example and others to argue that we do not need to use normality at all in determining causality. I do not agree. As we have seen, thinking in terms of normality helps in the Livengood voting example; there are many other examples given in [Halpern and Hitchcock 2014] where the use of normality, and in particular the ability to use normality to allow for gradation of causality, seems to be helpful. Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, people seem to take normality considerations into account. Finally, in the case of normality, we do not yet have an analogue to Theorem 4.4 that says that we can always add extra variables to remove the need for normality. There may well be examples where normality solves the problem, while no number of extra variables will deal with it.
The Stability of (Non-)Causality
The examples in Section 3 raise a potential concern. Consider the rock-throwing example again. Adding extra variables changed BT = 1 from being a cause of BS = 1 to not being a cause. Could adding even more variables convert BT = 1 back to being a cause? Could it then alternate further?
Indeed it can. In general, we can convert an event from being a cause to a non-cause and then back again infinitely often. Consider an arbitrary model M with variables A and B and a context u such that (M, u) |= A = 1 ∧ B = 1, but A = 1 is not a cause of B = 1 in (M, u) . I now show how to extend M in a conservative way so as to make A = 1 a cause of B = 1. Add a new binary variable to M , say X 1 , to get a model M ′ . Normally X 1 = 1. The equations for all variables are the same in M and M ′ unless A = X 0 = 0. If A = X 0 = 0, then B = 0. But if A = 1 then B = 1, no matter what the value of X 1 . It easily follows that A = 1 is a cause of B = 1, with witness ({X 1 }, 1, 0). It is then not hard to then add a variable Y 1 to "neutralize" the effect of X 1 , so that A = 1 is not a cause of B = 1. Repeating this construction infinitely often, we get a sequence of models where the the question of whether A = 1 is s cause of B = 1 alternates infinitely often.
I now formalize this. Specifically, I construct a sequence M 0 , M 1 , M 2 , . . . of causal models and contexts u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , . . ., such that M n+1 is a conservative extension M n , A = 1 is not a cause of B = 1 in the evennumbered models and corresponding contexts ((M 2 , u 2 ), (M 4 , u 4 ), . . . ), and A = 1 is a cause of B = 1 in the odd-numbered models and contexts ((M 1 , u 1 ), (M 3 , u 3 ), . . .). That is, the answer to the question "Is A = 1 a cause of B = 1?" alternates as we go along the sequence of models.
M 0 is just the model with two binary endogenous variables A and B with one binary exogenous variable U . The variables A and B are independent of each other; their value is completely determined by the context. In the context u 1 where U = 1, A = B = 1. In the context u 0 where U = 0, A = B = 0. Clearly, A = 1 is not a cause of B = 1 in (M 0 , u 1 ).
The models M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , . . . are defined inductively. For n ≥ 1, we get M 2n from M 2n−1 by adding a new variable X n ; we get M 2n+1 from M 2n by adding a new variable Y n . Thus, for n > 1, the model M 2n has the endogenous variables A, B, X 1 , . . . , X n , Y 1 , . . . , Y n ; the model M 2n+1 has the endogenous variables A, B, X 1 , . . . , X n1 , Y 1 , . . . , Y n . All these models have just one binary exogenous variable U . the values of the variables A, X 1 , . . . , X n in the models M 2n+1 and M 2n+2 In the context u j where U = j in M 2n+1 and M 2n+2 , A = X 1 = · · · = X n = j, for j = 0, 1 In M 2n+1 , the equation for Y 1 , . . . , Y n1 is just Y j = X j , j = 1, . . . , n − 1; X j determines Y j . In u 0 , B = 0; it's value is determined only by the context. In u 1 , B = 1 unless either (a) A = 0 and for some j < n, X j = Y j = 0 or X n = 0 or (b) A = 1 and X j = Y j for some j < n. In M 2n+2 , we add the equation Y n = X n and modify the equation for B so that in u 1 , B = 1 unless either (a) A = 0 and for some j ≤ n, X j = Y j = 0 or (b) A 1 and X j = Y j for some j ≤ n. Intuitively, B = 1 unless A = 0 and X j and Y j both take in the exceptional value 0, or A = 1 and X j is different from Y j (which is also an exceptional circumstance). Theorem 6.1: For all n ≥ 0, M n+1 is a conservative extension of M n . Moreover, A = 1 is not a cause of B = 1 in (M 2n , u 2n ), and A = 1 is a cause of B = 1 in (M 2n+1 , u 2n+1 ).
Proof: To see that M 2n+1 is a conservative extension of M 2n , note the equations for all variables but B and X n are the same in M 2n and M 2n+1 . It clearly suffices to show that, in both u 0 and u 1 , for every setting of the variables A, X 1 , . . . , X n−1 , Y 1 , . . . , Y n−1 , the value of B is the same in both M 2n and M 2n+1 . In context u 0 , B = 0 in both M 2n and M 2n+1 . In context u 1 , no matter how A, X 1 , . . . , X n−1 , Y 1 , . . . , Y n−1 are set, X n = 1. And if X n = 1, then the value of B depends on the values of A, X 1 , . . . , X n−1 , Y 1 , . . . , Y n−1 in the same way in both M 2n and M 2n+1 . in both u 0 and u 1 , for every setting of the variables A, X 1 , . . . , X n−1 , Y 1 , . . . , Y n−1 , the value of B is the same in both M 2n and M 2n+1 .
The argument that M 2n+2 is a conservative extension of M 2n+1 is almost identical. Now we have to show that in both u 0 and u 1 , for every setting of the variables A, X 1 , . . . , X n , Y 1 , . . . , Y n−1 , the value of B is the same in both M 2n and M 2n+1 . Again, this is immediate in in u 0 . In context u 1 , note that X n = Y n , and again the result easily follows.
To see that A = 1 is a cause of B = 1 in (M 2n+1 , u 1 ), take W = {X n }. It is immediate that (M 2n+1 , u 1 ) |= [A ← 0, X n = 0](B = 0), so AC2(a) holds. Moreover, (M 2n+1 , u 1 ) |= [A ← 1, X n = 0](B = 1) and (M 2n+1 , u 1 ) |= [A ← 1](B = 1), so AC2(b) holds. (Note that all of X 1 , . . . , X n1 , Y 1 , . . . , Y n−1 get the same value in u 1 whether or not X n is set to 1.)
Finally, to see that A = 1 is not a cause of B = 1 in (M 2n+2 , u 1 ), suppose, by way of contraction, it is a cause, with witness ( W , w, 0). For AC2(a) to hold, we must have (M 2n+2 , u 1 ) |= [A ← 0, W ← w](B = 0). Thus, it must be the case that there is some j such that {X j , Y j } ⊆ W and w is such that X j and Y j are set to 0. But then let W ′ = W − {X j }. Then we must have (M 2n+2 , u 1 ) |= [A ← 1, W ′ ← w](B = 0), because, in context u 1 , X j is set to 1, and this is not overridden by W ′ , and if A = 1, X j = 1, and Y j = 0, then B = 0. Thus, AC2(b) does not hold. This completes the argument. Proposition 6.1 is somewhat disconcerting. It seems that looking more and more carefully at a situation should not result in our view of X = x being a cause of Y = y alternating between "yes" and "no", at least, not if we do not discover anything inconsistent with our understanding of the relations between previously known variables.
While disconcerting, I do not believe that, in fact, this is a problem. A child may start with a primitive understanding of how the world works, and believe that just throwing a rock causes a bottle to shatter. Later he may become aware of the importance of the rock actually hitting the bottle. Still later, he may become of other features critical to bottles shattering. This increased awareness can and should result in causality ascriptions changing. However, in practice, there are very few new features that should matter. We can make this precise by observing that, most new features that we become aware of are almost surely irrelevant to the bottle shattering except perhaps in highly abnormal circumstances. If the new variables were relevant, we probably would have become aware of them sooner. (Recall the gloss that I gave above when introducing the variable X n : the value X n = 0, which was needed to establish A = 1 being a cause of B = 1, was an abnormal value.)
As I now show, once we take normality into account, under reasonable assumptions, non causality is stable.
Proof: Suppose that X = x is not a cause of ϕ in (M, u), M ′ is a conservative extension of M , and X = x is a cause of ϕ in (M ′ , u) with witness ( W , w, x ′ ) . Let W 1 be the intersection of W with V, the set of endogenous variables in M , let Z 1 = V − W , and let w 1 be the restriction of w to the variables in W 1 . Since X = x is not a cause of ϕ in (M, u), it is certainly not a cause with witness ( W 1 , w 1 , x ′ ), so either (a) (M, u) |= X = x ∨ ¬ϕ (i.e., AC1 is violated); (b) (M, u) |= [ X ← x ′ , W 1 ← w 1 ]ϕ (i.e., AC2(a) is violated), (c) there exist subsets W ′ 1 of W 1 and Z ′ 1 of Z 1 such that if (M, u) |= Z ′ 1 = z 1 (i.e., z 1 gives the actual values of the variables in Z ′ 1 ), then (M, u) |= [ X ← x, W ′ 1 ← w 1 , Z ′ 1 ← z 1 ]¬ϕ (i.e., AC2(b) is violated), or (d) there is a strict subset X ′ of X such that X ′ = x ′ is a cause of ϕ in (M, u) , where x ′ is the restriction of x to the variables in X ′ (i.e., AC3 is violated). Since M ′ is a conservative extension of M , by Lemma 4.3, if (a) or (c) holds, then the same statement holds with M replaced by M ′ , showing that X = x is not a cause of ϕ in (M ′ , u). If (b) holds, it is still consistent that AC2(a) holds in M ′ with witness ( W , w, x ′ ). However, if, for each variable u) . Thus, either X = x is not a cause of ϕ in (M ′ , u), or one of (c) or (d) holds.
As an immediate corollary, we get that, if we take normality into account, then non-causality is stable in the single-variable case if it is abnormal for the extra variables to take on a value other than the one they get in the actual context. I believe that the conditions of this corollary (specifically, that it will be abnormal for extra variables to take on values different from the ones in the actual context) capture the intuition that we do not often discover substantively interesting new features. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, in practice, non-causality is stable (or, more precisely, quickly stabilizes).
The requirement that we are talking about single-variable causality in Corollary 6.3 has some bite, but not much. stability of non-causality does not hold in general, even with the abnormality assumption, as Example 6.5 below shows. However, I can show that there can be at most one change from non-causality to causality. It follows that we cannot get an infinite sequence of causal models, each one a conservative extension of the one before, where the answer to the question "Is X = x a cause of ϕ?" alternates from "Yes" to "No" and back again under reasonable (ab)normality assumptions.
Corollary 6.4:
There is no sequence M 1 , M 2 , M 3 of causal models such that M 3 is a conservative extension of M 2 , M 2 is a conservative extension of M 1 and a context u in M 1 such that X = x is a cause of ϕ in (M 1 , u) and in (M 3 , u), but not in (M 2 , u) if, for all endogenous variables V in M 3 that are not in M 1 , if (M 3 , u) |= V = v, then s u ≻ s for any world s (either over the variables in M 2 or the variables in M 3 ) such that U = u and V = v. Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is such a sequence M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 . By Theorem 6.2, there must be a strict subset X ′ of X such that X ′ = x ′ is a cause of ϕ in (M 2 , u), where x ′ is the restriction of x to the variables in X ′ . But X ′ = x ′ cannot be a cause of ϕ in (M 1 , u), for then, by AC3, X = x would not be a cause of ϕ in (M 1 , u). By Theorem 6.2 again, there must be a strict subset X ′′ of X ′ such that X" = x" is a cause of ϕ in (M 1 , u) , where x" is the restriction of x to X". But then, by AC3, X = x cannot be a cause of ϕ in (M 1 , u), giving us the desired contradiction.
The following example, which is a variant of the example in [Halpern 2008] showing that a cause may involve more than one conjunct, shows that Corollary 6.4 is the best that we can hope for. It is possible for a non-cause to become a cause if it has more than one conjunct. Example 6.5: A votes for a candidate. A's vote is recorded in two optical scanners B and C. D collects the output of the scanners. The candidate wins (i.e., WIN = 1) if any of A, B, or D is 1. The value of A is determined by the exogenous variable. The following structural equations characterize the the remaining variables: B = A, C = A, D = B ∧ C, WIN = A ∨ B ∨ D. Call the resulting causal model M . In the actual context u, A = 1, so B = C = D = WIN = 1. I claim that B = 1 is a cause of WIN = 1 in (M, u). To see this, take W = {A}. Consider the contingency where A = 0. Clearly if B = 0, then WIN = 0, while if B = 1, WIN = 1. It is easy to check that AC2 holds. Moreover, since B = 1 is a cause of WIN = 1 in (M, u), by AC3, B = 1 ∧ C = 1 cannot be a cause of WIN = 1 in (M, u) . Now consider the model M ′ which is just like M , except that there is one more exogenous variable D ′ , where D ′ = B ∧ ¬A. The equation for WIN now changes to WIN = A ∨ D ′ ∨ D. All the other equations in M ′ are the same as those in M . Roughly speaking, D ′ acts like BH in the rock-throwing example.
It is easy to see that M ′ is a conservative extension of M . Since D ′ does not affect any variable but WIN and all the equations except that for WIN are unchanged, it suffices to show that for all settings of the variables other than D ′ and WIN, WIN has the same value in context u in both M and M ′ . Clearly if A = 1 or D = 1, then WIN = 1 in both M and M ′ . So suppose that we set A = D = 0. Now if B = 1, then D ′ = 1 (since A = 0), so again WIN = 1 in both M and M ′ . On the other hand, if B = 0, then D ′ = 0, so WIN = 0 in both M and M ′ .
Finally, as I now show, B = 1 ∧ C = 1 is a cause of WIN = 1 in (M ′ , u). To see this, first observe that AC1 clearly holds. For AC2, let W = {A} (so Z = {B, C, D, D ′ , WIN}) and take w = 0 (so we are considering the contingency where A = 0). Clearly, (M, u) |= [A ← 0, B ← 0, C ← 0](WIN = 0), so AC2(a) holds, and (M, u) |= [A = 0, B = 1, C = 1](WIN = 1) ← 1. Moreover, (M, u) |= [B ← 1, C ← 1](WIN = 1), and WIN = 1 continues to hold even if D is set to 1 and/or D ′ is set to 0 (their values in (M, u)). Thus, AC2 holds.
It remains to show that AC3 holds and, in particular, that neither B = 1 nor C = 1 is a cause of WIN = 1 in (M ′ , u). The argument is the same for both B = 1 and C = 1, so I just show it for B = 1. Roughly speaking, B = 1 is not a cause of WIN = 1 for essentially the same reason that BH = 1 is not a cause of BS = 1. For suppose that B = 1 were a cause. Then we would have to have A ∈ W , and we would need to consider the contingency where A = 0 (for otherwise WIN = 1 no matter how we set B). Now we need to consider two cases: D ′ ∈ W and D ′ ∈ Z. If D ′ ∈ W , then if we consider the contingency where D ′ = 0, we have (M ′ , u) |= [A ← 0, B ← 1, D ′ ← 0](WIN = 0), so AC2(b) fails (no matter whether C and D are in W or Z). And if we consider the contingency where D ′ = 1, then AC2(a) fails, since (M ′ , u) |= [A ← 0, B ← 0, D ′ ← 1](WIN = 1). Now if D ′ ∈ Z, note that (M, u) |= D ′ = 0. Moreover, as we have observed, (M, u) |= [A = 0, B = 1, D ′ = 0](WIN = 0), so again AC2(b) fails (no matter whether C or D are in W or Z). Thus, B = 1 is not a cause of WIN = 1 in (M ′ , u).
Thus, B = 1 ∧ C = 1 goes from not being a cause of WIN = 1 in (M, u) to being a cause of WIN = 1 in (M ′ , u). All this remains true even if all worlds where D = 1 are viewed as abnormal (since D ′ = 0 in all the relevant witnesses). Thus, normality considerations do not affect this argument.
Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated the HP definition of causality is remarkably resilient, but it emphasizes how sensitive knowledge representation can be to the choice of models. The focus has been on showing that the choice of variables is a powerful modeling tool. But it is one that can be abused. One lesson that comes out clearly is the need to have variables that describe the mechanism of causality, particularly if there is more than one mechanism. However, this is hardly a general recipe. Rather, it is a heuristic for constructing a "good" model. As Halpern and Hitchcock [2010] point out, constructing a good model is still more of an art than a science.
